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Many commentators in the Western world look upon Pakistani feminism 
as a recent phenomenon, applauding South-Asian feminists for their progression 
up the scale of human development as they advocate for women’s equality and 
basic human rights within an oppressive, religious, male-dominated culture. 
This, however, is a false perception of Pakistani culture and of the majority of 
Muslim societies in general. Feminism, in its various forms, has been present 
and active in Pakistan since the nation’s founding in 1947. As a country, Paki-
stan has a history of political division between secularism and the Islamization 
of law and society (Cheema 60). These two political camps, whose histories are 
both based in Pakistan’s colonial past, have been competing for power since the 
nation’s independence and have influenced Pakistan’s two main feminist camps: 
secular feminism and Islamic feminism. These two camps have their own his-
tory of dialogue and discourse with each other which is no less hostile than the 
dialogue between Pakistan’s political parties. This paper will explore this dia-
logue between secular and Islamic feminists within Pakistan while analyzing the 
impact that these feminist discourses have had on Pakistani society; as the divide 
between secular and Islamic feminists increases and hostilities rise, the possibil-
ity of social change decreases for Pakistani women. The paper will also address 
the contemporary, parallel problem of feminist struggles in Tunisia, the Arab 
world’s “leading women’s rights” nation, in order to contextualize the Pakistani 
feminist situation. 
II. The Pakistani Context 
Pakistan gained its independence from Britain in 1947. Unlike today’s 
conservative Islamic society, Pakistan was founded as a democratic, secular state 
which promised religious freedom to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, as well as 
equal rights for women. Further, its founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah, was a progressive, secular member of the elite class. In an attempt to 
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create a tolerant, pluralistic state, Jinnah established Pakistan as a republic. This 
vision was intended to bring freedom to the ninety-seven percent Muslim pop-
ulation while also protecting the rights and freedoms of all religions (Valentine 
104). During this time, women enjoyed many privileges and freedoms under the 
first Muslim Shanat laws, which guaranteed them political representation, equal 
pay, and inheritance and divorce rights (Cheema). Many of these freedoms can 
be traced back to the work done by Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Ali Jinnah, who 
founded multiple women’s rights movements before and after the establishment 
of Pakistan as a nation (Ovais). Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali Khan, the wife of 
Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan’s first Minister of Finance and close friend of Ali 
Jinnah), also played a significant role in ensuring women’s rights. In particular, 
she established the All Women’s Pakistan Association in 1949, which aimed to 
further women’s moral and social standing across the country (Ovais). 
 It was not until the late 1970s, under the rule of Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, 
that Pakistan began to move towards political Islamization. In light of the war 
in Afghanistan and the threat of U.S. invasion, right-wing, conservative, politi-
co-religious groups called for the establishment of Shari’a law in Pakistan, and 
in 1977, Zia-ul-Haq took power and declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic. It 
was under Zia’s rule in 1979 that the notoriously misogynistic Hudood laws, new 
ordinances which covered rape, adultery, theft, robbery, and prohibition, were 
implemented (Jamal 51). The 1984 Law of Evidence soon followed, declaring 
that the testimonies of two women were needed in order to counter the testimony 
of one man (Cheema). By the mid-1980s, women had effectively become sec-
ond-class citizens in Pakistan and held few rights within the patriarchal society. 
 During this era, many modern women’s rights movements were estab-
lished in resistance to these laws. For example, the Women’s Action Forum was 
established in 1981 and staged large protests against the Law of Evidence and 
the Hudood ordinances (Gardezi 18). Women’s rights movements gained the 
most traction in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the government of Benazir 
Bhutto. After Bhutto was removed from office in 1996, however, the Council of 
Islamic Ideology cracked down on women’s rights movements and established 
laws making it illegal for women to protest in public (Cheema). Today, women 
in Pakistan continue to fight for their rights in spite of the legal consequences.
III. The Two Feminisms
 There are two dominant threads of feminist discourse within Pakistan 
today: secular liberal feminism and modern Islamic feminism. These two threads 
are not unique to Pakistan. In fact, they have been deeply influenced by contem-
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porary global feminist discourses. When mixed with geographic, historical, and 
contemporary social contexts, however, the theories and practices which accom-
pany these two threads manifest themselves in ways which reflect the particulari-
ty of the Pakistani feminist situation. In order to understand this Pakistani hybrid, 
both its outer influences and its current social context must be understood. 
Secular feminist theory advocates for equal rights between men and 
women, viewing feminism as a basic extension of universal human rights. Some 
of Pakistan’s leading contemporary secular feminists include Shahnaz Rouse, 
Fouzia Saeed, Farida Shaheed, Khawar Mumtaz and Nighat Said Khan. These 
figures are responsible for the majority of secular feminist literature in Pakistan 
and serve as the representatives of many secularist human rights movements. In 
a sharp break with their Islamic counterparts, secular feminists also advocate for 
the separation of religion and state. Within this perspective, Islam is seen as a 
problem that women are fighting to overcome. For instance, Fouzia Saeed speaks 
publicly about her sexual abuse in the workplace, attributing her ordeal to reli-
gious factors. This abuse was committed in the name of Islam as an intimidation 
tactic to force women out of the public workplace (“Negotiating New Terrains” 
91). This horrible experience led Saeed to become a secular women’s rights ac-
tivist (Abid). As a secular feminist, Saeed does not believe that Islam is compat-
ible with equality. A large portion of secular feminist discourse is consequently 
aimed towards “enlightening” Muslim women by educating them on the freedom 
that is available outside of Islam. This discourse is considered “paternalistic” by 
Islamic feminists and many Muslim women in general and is one of the main 
reasons for the ongoing division between secular feminists and the majority of 
Pakistani Muslim women. 
 Modern Islamic feminism takes a different approach to women’s free-
dom. Instead of advocating for fifty-fifty equality between men and women, 
Islamic feminists call for men to uphold their responsibilities towards women 
and for women to be educated about their rights (Hébert 2). This form of femi-
nism does not call for the eradication of gender roles or the institution of democ-
racy. Instead, Islamic feminism calls for the proper treatment of women within 
a Muslim society as laid out in the Qur’an. As expressed by feminist historian 
Margot Badran, Islamic feminism tries “to open up the Qur’an to anti-patriarchal 
readings” (“Asma Barlas” 15). Instead of blaming Islam for Pakistan’s extreme 
Shari’a laws, Islamic feminists blame men and their patriarchal legal traditions 
for the discrimination women face. These feminists attempt to merge Islamic 
rights and freedoms with contemporary Pakistani culture. They make it clear 
that they are not fighting for what Western women have gained but for what 
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the Qur’an can give them (Hébert 1). Because of the movement’s rejection of 
Western ideals and acceptance of Qur’anic principles, Islamic feminism tends 
to appeal to people who value the teachings of the Qur’an, primarily the lower, 
middle and upper-middle strata of society (Cheema). Thus, the movement’s more 
conservative theology appeals to a larger portion of society than that of the elite, 
leftist secular feminists. 
Conflict between feminist circles in any context is common. Howev-
er, the divide between secular and Islamic feminist communities in Pakistan 
is uncommonly wide and especially hostile due to influences that go beyond 
feminism itself. Part of this conflict derives from contemporary Pakistani class 
divisions. In general, women are categorized into three main groups: the elite, 
the middle class, and the lower class. Belonging in one of these classes largely 
predetermines what kind of feminist a Pakistani woman will be. This predeter-
mination stems from the fact that women in each of these classes are treated 
differently according to their social standing and, therefore, are impacted differ-
ently by Pakistan’s Islamic laws (Akhtar and Metraux). Women in the elite class, 
due to their resources and social standing, live a privileged lifestyle that often 
exempts them from the consequences of Shari’a law. Middle and lower class 
rural women, however, have little to no influence within their social circles and, 
consequently, are fully subject to Pakistan’s oppressive Islamic laws. Therefore, 
due to their superior resources, higher education, and greater internationalization, 
women from the elite class tend to be more receptive to a progressive, secular 
lifestyle and its corresponding brand of feminism. Middle and lower class wom-
en have fewer privileges and less access to education and thus gravitate towards 
Islamic feminism due to their familiarity with the religion and its associated 
values (Kalia 99). Thus, the division between feminist theories is predicated as 
much on class differences as it is theological disagreements. 
Because of this societal gap, the dialogue between secular and Islamic 
feminists in the Pakistani context mainly consists of attempts by both factions 
to delegitimize each other’s platform in order to support their own particular 
view (Jamal 57). Thus, dialogue across political and theological circles tends 
to devolve into competition or argument in which both sides “yell” loudly but 
neither is truly heard. On one hand, secular feminist discourse seeks to discredit 
Islamic feminism by regurgitating orientalist arguments regarding Muslim wom-
en and the veil. The concept of Purdah in Pakistan, a physical and metaphorical 
curtain dividing men from women, is a particularly controversial issue that has 
been at the center of the struggle between secular and Islamic feminists. Secular 
feminists argue that Purdah encourages gender segregation in both the private 
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and public spheres. According to this view, Purdah reinforces the principle that, 
as the weaker sex, women “need protection [from] the household’s men” (Riaz 
35). On the other hand, Islamic feminists look to the Qur’an to justify gender 
segregation in a way that provides agency to women. For example, they consider 
veiling to be a safe practice that allows women to feel secure in the knowledge 
that they are exempt from the scrutiny of the public eye. Despite these explana-
tions offered by Islamic feminists, secular feminists point to the discriminatory 
laws, such as the Hudood ordinances, that were implemented due to the principle 
of Purdah and criticize the Qur’an for its “faulted” or “outdated” rules regarding 
the treatment of women (Riaz 35). Thus, the accusations against Islamic practic-
es once again revolve around the concept of fear – in this case, fear of the op-
pressive Pakistani Shari’a law. This appeal to fear can also be seen in the secular 
school’s most prominent accusation against Islamic feminists, namely the claim 
that Islamic feminists are mere “fundamentalists” with a conservative, right-wing 
agenda (Jamal 57). This accusation is meant to delegitimize Islamic feminists 
and instill fear in Pakistan’s secular groups about the rise of Islamization. 
 Two of the loudest and most controversial international voices advocat-
ing for secular, liberal feminism are the Somali-Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi-Ali 
and the Pakistani Islamic reformist Irshad Manji. Hirsi-Ali is known for her 
contentious critiques and accusatory statements about Islam and the treatment of 
women within Islamic cultures. Hirsi-Ali blames Islamic ideology and religion 
for the abuse, repression, and violence suffered by Muslim women in Islamic 
societies. She claims that Islam is an inherently violent religion and is the cause 
of the mistreatment of women in Muslim majority cultures (De Leeuw and Van 
Wichelen 3). Irshad Manji, a Pakistani-Canadian feminist and Islamic reform-
ist, has spoken alongside Hirsi Ali multiple times on the dangers of Islam and 
the need for Islamic reform. As a member of the LGBT community, Manji has 
experienced Pakistani Islam as a conservative, repressive religion, unaccepting 
of her sexuality and her beliefs. Because of this personal experience, she strong-
ly criticizes Pakistani society and Islamic religion, calling for the reform of both 
(Manji). 
 As such, the platforms of both Manji and Hirsi-Ali are highly critical of 
Islam and many Muslims consider them to be ignorant of the differences be-
tween culture, religion, and social context (Gebreyes). These critics hold that it 
is not Manji and Hirsi-Ali’s platforms that hinder opportunities for dialogue but 
rather their unwillingness to attempt to understand other viewpoints. For exam-
ple, Hirsi-Ali’s statements proclaiming that Islam is “the new fascism” and “a 
destructive, nihilistic cult of death” do not foster an environment for empathetic 
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listening. Instead, such statements increase polarization and enlarge the existing 
gap between secular and Islamic feminists. These accusatory attempts at dele-
gitimization are inherently reactionary and, as reactionary responses tend to be, 
rooted in fear. In the battle to win respect in the eyes of the global public, anti-Is-
lamic statements by secular feminists like Hirsi Ali and Irshad Manji serve as a 
weapon to denigrate Islamic feminism (Khalid). 
Islamic feminist discourse engages in the same sort of attempt to delegit-
imize its opponents. They do this through the rhetoric of Western collaboration 
and domination within Pakistan. The main accusation is that secular feminist 
movements are “embedded in Western notions of autonomy and freedom that are 
supposed to be contrary to indigenous cultural or religious practices” (Jamal 56). 
This perspective purports that feminism as a movement is inseparable from its 
Western connotation and therefore is not legitimate in Pakistan. As Kimball out-
lines in his article on hermeneutic listening, in order for dialogue to successfully 
affect change, both parties must be willing to listen to the other while also ac-
knowledging that their biases influence their understanding of the other (Kimball 
and Garrison 51). These characteristics are not present in the Pakistani feminist 
dialogue. Instead of constructively bridging the gap between secular and Islamic 
feminist theories, these dialogues often intensify the segregation between the two 
groups (Jamal 57). If each group chooses to ignore the other’s similarities and 
instead focus on their extreme differences, dialogue between feminist circles will 
continue to be accusatory and hostile. Conversely, dialogue which occurs within 
the boundaries of either secularist or Islamist circles tends to be much more civil 
than dialogue which occurs outside of these circles. The reason for this increased 
civility is that each activist within the group shares the same core values, mak-
ing it easier for the women to set aside their own opinions and listen to what the 
other is saying.
This unity can be observed in the dialogue regarding feminism and 
“the West” between the Pakistani Islamic feminist Asma Barlas and the Leba-
nese-American Islamic feminist Margot Badran. In an essay detailing her on-
going dialogue with Margot Badran, Barlas explains how a successful in-group 
dialogue resulted in her shift in perspective regarding the term “feminist.” As 
an Islamic “feminist” (feminist being in quotations because of Badran’s original 
hesitation to use the term), Badran’s platform is typically anti-Western. However, 
the extremity of her convictions initially caused her to reject the term “femi-
nist” due to her assumption about its implied Western affiliation. The dialogue 
which occurs between Badran and Barlas causes Badran to conclude that Islamic 
feminists’ rejection of the term “feminism” is in fact due to an ignorance of the 
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historical feminist movement within Islam. 
Within their dialogue, Badran addresses Barlas’ two major questions: 
First, is feminism a Western concept, or is there evidence of it in Islamic histo-
ry? And second, can one resist the label of “feminist” while still advocating for 
women’s rights? Like many Pakistani Muslim “feminists,” Barlas previously 
rejected the term “feminism” because of its (perceived) representation of West-
ern ideals. In particular, she expresses her frustration at the ignorance of Western 
women regarding Muslim or “brown” agency, stating that her “resistance was a 
displacement of frustration with real, live, feminists, all of them white... many of 
[whom] seemed utterly blind to the racial politics of speaking for women of col-
or” (“Asma Barlas” 17). In essence, Barlas argues that the “liberty” associated 
with Western feminism is muted for non-white individuals. For those who do not 
uphold Western values, Western feminism entails loss of voice and loss of self, 
often as a result of the attempts by Western women to “save” Muslims from the 
shackles of oppressive religion. By treating independent, self-actualizing Muslim 
women as oppressed and in need of foreign intervention, the paternalistic atti-
tudes of Western feminists thus leads many Pakistani feminists to reject the term 
“feminism” due to its affiliation with “Western liberty.”
 In theory, all types of feminism seek equal rights between men and 
women. The differences between the feminist strands emerge when feminists at-
tempt to define “equality.” Is equality measured in sameness or in value? Islamic 
feminists argue that the problem with Western feminism is that it advocates for 
sameness between men and women. However, is “sameness” true equality? In 
her essay, Barlas describes women as equal to men but not the same as men. This 
view means that women should be treated with equal value, but they should not 
be subject to all of the same laws. A counterexample to this view would be the 
Free the Nipple Movement in the United States which advocates for women’s 
right to “go topless” in public. The FTN movement is fighting for women to be 
subject to the same laws as men regardless of sexual differences (Zeilinger). 
Islamic feminists, however, would disagree with this form of activism since it 
disregards traditional gender roles and ignores the physical differences between 
the male and female anatomy. Islamic feminists argue that they are not fighting 
for what Western women have gained but rather for their own particular rights as 
outlined in the Qur’an. However, many Western feminists argue that the con-
ception of equality espoused by Islamic feminists is the product of naiveté and 
ignorance. Instead of working together with their Islamic counterparts, these 
Western feminists attempt to impose their own brand of “equality” on the women 
of Pakistan. Barlas, like most Islamic feminists, has no patience for this kind of 
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condescending attitude. Hence, Barlas argues that Western feminists have tainted 
the core concepts of feminism through their misunderstanding of “equality” and 
their “paternalistic” attitudes towards non-Western women (“Asma Barlas” 17). 
Because of these differences, Barlas originally rejected the term “feminist” in its 
entirety.
In light of these critiques of both Islamic and Western feminism, the 
question becomes: “What is feminism?” Specifically, is feminism only a West-
ern concept? Islamic feminism, as defined by Margot Badran, is a “discourse of 
gender equality that derives its mandate from the Qur’an and seeks rights and 
justice for all human beings across the totality of the public-private continuum” 
(Bedran qtd. in “Margot Bedran: Engaging Islamic Feminism” 28). In opposi-
tion to this view, critics of Islam frequently point to the life and teachings of the 
Prophet Mohammad as the source of women’s oppression. Badran attempts to 
counter this argument by highlighting the significant roles that women played in 
Islamic society during the time of the Prophet. The Prophet’s first wife, herself 
a prominent business woman, was a strong and powerful leader, responsible 
for both helping her husband realize his potential and recording his teachings 
after his passing. As Badran points out, the fact that women such as the Prophet 
Mohammad’s wife served in a capacity equal to, or nearly equal to, men suggests 
that the roots of feminism existed in the early Islamic society described in the 
Qur’an, long before the advent of Western feminism. 
Therefore, Badran encourages Barlas to embrace the term “feminist” 
confidently knowing that feminism is an Islamic ideal. Badran’s perspective has 
since influenced Barlas to change her views on the term “feminism.” She now 
calls herself an Islamic feminist, rejecting the negative Western connotations of 
the term and linking herself with historical Islam (“Margot Bedran” 23).  This 
conversation is an example of the significance of meaningful, in-group dialogue.
IV. Common Enemies: the Malala Case-Study
Despite their numerous differences, both Islamic and secular feminists do 
share a common interest in the improvement of women’s rights, and that makes 
both groups a perceived threat to Islamic society according to Pakistan’s right-
wing politico-religious parties, all of which reject feminism entirely. These par-
ties claim that any teachings promoting women’s equality trade Qur’anic prin-
ciples for hedonistic, secular Western ideals. Consequently, Islamic feminists, 
and, more pointedly, secular feminists who reject Islam outright, are frequently 
in danger from Islamic extremists and even risk imprisonment or assassination 
by the government for violating the blasphemy law. For example, in December 
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2007, the world watched as Pakistan’s first and only female Prime Minister, 
Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated by two gunmen after leaving a rally. Although 
she was one of the strongest symbols of women’s empowerment in Pakistan 
throughout the 1990’s, Bhutto had become a victim of the “culture of exclusion 
and male dominance,” against which she fought (Akhtar and Metraux). In April 
2015, another prominent figure, the well-known activist and human rights ad-
vocate Sabeen Mahmud, was assassinated in a similar manner after hosting a 
seminar with a group of political activists in Karachi (Thilesen). Whether the of-
fending person is Islamic or secular, politician or activist, contemporary Pakistan 
is a dangerous country for those who speak out against the dominant patriarchal 
culture. 
 The life and work of the world-renowned Pakistani advocate for women’s 
education Malala Yousafzai provides a clear example of the struggle between 
Islamic feminism, secular feminism, and the Western world. Much dialogue and 
critique have been sparked regarding the Western representation of young Malala 
as Pakistan’s feminist heroine. This short case study will examine how Malala’s 
life and educational mission has crossed between the boundaries of traditional 
Pakistani culture, secular feminism, personal faith, and Western ideals while 
analyzing how Malala is perceived within these varying circles. Although she is 
celebrated all over the world, Malala’s affiliation with so many different political, 
religious, and activist circles essentially leaves her isolated from full acceptance 
in any one group. 
 Malala identifies as a practicing Muslim, a Pakistani citizen, and an 
advocate for peace through education. For many of her critics, these three forms 
of identification cannot coexist. Pakistan’s conservative politico-religious groups 
renounce Malala as a Muslim because of the fact that she advocates for rights 
that are perceived to be contrary to Islamic principles. Pakistani, female, Muslim 
activists do not accept her within their Islamic feminist circles because they be-
lieve her agenda aligns too closely with secular feminism. Secular feminists do 
not agree with her Islamic principles, and the West likes to conveniently forget 
that she identifies as a practicing Muslim. Malala’s situation consequently leaves 
her in a limbo of belonging. 
 Riffat Hassan, a well-known Pakistani, Muslim feminist, comments on 
this conundrum of the isolation of Islamic feminists in her article, “Muslim 
Women and Human Rights: The Unarticulated Quandary.” Hassan states that 
many Islamic feminists develop a distrust of Muslim societies due to the per-
secution that they experience because of their feminist activism. Malala, for 
example, considers herself a devout Muslim, yet the fact that she advocates for 
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women’s education has resulted in her becoming a target for the Taliban. This 
distrust often leads to bitterness and anger towards Islamic patriarchal systems, 
a reaction which in turn garners support and sympathy from the West, such as 
Malala experienced after she was shot by the Taliban (Hassan). Western sym-
pathy, however, is extended only so long as Muslim women remain “rebels and 
deviants within the world of Islam” (Hassan). Malala is loved and praised by the 
West because she is despised by the Taliban, a terrorist group that fits nicely into 
the Western world’s category of “bad Muslims.” However, her Islamic faith is 
rarely mentioned by the media. Therefore, on one hand, Malala does not fit West-
ern ideals because she openly proclaims her Islamic faith. On the other hand, she 
battles against terrorists and the suppressors of women, so the West is willing to 
ignore her faith and instead emphasize the values that she shares with Western 
society.
 As Malala is further endorsed by Western countries, the distance between 
her and the largely conservative Pakistani public grows larger. For example, 
after she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014, the media exploded with 
dialogue between secular and Muslim academics who argued over the effects 
that this award would have on her education campaign. Tabish Khair, an Indian 
author and professor, commented, “what Islamist extremists could not do with 
their brutality and bullets, the West seems to have managed with adulation and 
accolades” (Kahir)  Khair is speaking here of the process of delegitimization. 
Kahir argues that Western association has segregated Malala from conservative 
Muslim Pakistani society and threatens to do more lasting harm to her message 
than any Taliban assassination attempt could (Kahir). This segregation seriously 
undermines Malala’s educational agenda and stands in the way of any real politi-
cal progress which would benefit women’s education.
 Rafia Zakaria, a Pakistani-American journalist and feminist author, 
responds to this growing rift between Malala and the majority of conservative 
Pakistani society in her article, “Malala the Muslim Feminist.” Zakaria contrasts 
Malala’s feminist educational platform with Holland’s prominent secular fem-
inist Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Renowned for her controversial views opposing Islam, 
Hirsi Ali argues that all Muslim women are oppressed within Islam and there-
fore they must renounce their culture and faith in order to find true freedom. 
Zakaria points out that Malala, unlike Hirsi Ali, does not argue for the rejection 
of religion or culture but rather speaks as a Muslim for the rights of Muslim 
women. Therefore, according to Zakaria, Malala’s message should be viewed 
by Pakistani Muslims as aligning with their interests, regardless of her endorse-
ment by the West. Zakaria describes Malala’s story as an inspiration for Muslim 
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girls across the globe and states that it is “proof that feminism, or the desire 
for equality through education and empowerment, is not the terrain of any one 
culture or faith,” but rather it is a value that has existed throughout the history of 
civilization (Zakaria). The claim that Zakaria makes with regards the universality 
of feminist terminology is the same concept that was discussed between Margo 
Badran and Asma Barlas. Zakaria justifies Malala’s juggling of feminism, Islam, 
and the West to her followers by arguing that the desire for equality between men 
and women is not the unique terrain of Western culture but is instead a univer-
sal phenomenon which should be in line with Pakistani interests. Thus, Malala 
Yousafzai’s diverse reception, ranging from harsh denunciation to beaming adu-
lation, serves to exemplify the divisions and quarrels between Pakistani feminist 
groups. 
V. The Outcomes of Feminism: Pakistan and Tunisia Compared
 Thus far, this paper has examined the feminist movement in Pakistan and 
explored the dialogues occurring between secular and Islamic feminists groups. 
What is yet to be discussed is the level of effectiveness of these feminist groups 
and the significance of their dialogue in creating actual change within Pakistani 
society. This question itself has become a dialogue between supporters and 
critics of Pakistani feminism. The reality is that twenty-first-century Pakistan is 
still an extremely difficult and dangerous place for women. This fact is undeni-
able, evidenced by the continual persecution faced by contemporary Pakistani 
feminists. The discussions that arise from this fact revolve around the question of 
whether or not feminist groups themselves are to blame for this lack of change. 
 A very critical article by Pakistani author Yasser Latif Hamdani in Paki-
stan’s Daily Times argued that feminists are indeed to blame for the lack of real 
social change in Pakistan. Hamdani’s main argument is that social change can 
only take place when men support women’s causes, as witnessed by the history 
of the global feminist movement. He argues that a fundamental shift in the status 
of women in Pakistan has yet to materialize because feminist groups have “fool-
ishly” rejected the support of men in their quest for change (Hamdani). Hamdani 
also criticizes the divisions between Pakistani feminist groups, claiming that 
feminism within Pakistan can hardly be called a “movement” since it is anything 
but united (Hamdani). The fact that women’s action movements, such as Wom-
en’s Action Forum and Jamaat-e-Islami, cannot even agree on which sorts of 
rights and freedoms they should advocate for makes it difficult to establish what 
kind of change is necessary.
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Internet community of Pakistani 
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feminists responded harshly towards Hamdani and his perspective on the effec-
tiveness of women’s movements. Bina Shah, a well-known Pakistani writer and 
author of a widely followed blog, responded to Hamdani with an article titled, 
“Nothing’s Wrong With Pakistani Feminists.” In the article, Shah highlights the 
progress that has been achieved over the past decade in passing pro-women leg-
islation in Pakistan (Shah). She notes the examples of the Honour Killing Bill in 
March 2015, the Sexual Harassment Bill in 2010, the Domestic Violence Bill in 
2013, the Acid Control Bill in 2010, and the Acid Attack Bill in 2011, all protect-
ing women from what was previously culturally acceptable male-inflicted vio-
lence (Haider; “Zardari signs bill”; “Celebrating Milestones”; Khan). These bills 
were all passed due to the persistence of female legislators and women’s rights 
groups (such as the WAF, in partnership with the Pakistan People’s Party) show-
ing that, at least on a legislative level, Pakistani feminists have affected serious, 
demonstrable change over the past decade. 
However, despite legislative progress, Pakistani society is still over-
whelmingly conservative and anti-Western. For example, on December 1, 2015, 
Pakistan voted against the resolution of the United Nations General Assem-
bly which called for the recognition and protection of human rights protectors 
(“HRCP alarmed by Pak opposition to UN resolution”). Human rights activists 
in Pakistan, including feminists, are in frequent danger of abuse or assassina-
tion yet Pakistani society is unwilling to protect them because of their perceived 
association with the West. It would appear, therefore, that pro-women legislation 
has not created a real cultural change in attitudes towards women, and many 
have argued that feminist groups have reached an impasse in their effectiveness 
because they work in isolation. 
There is no doubt that the divide between the two main feminist camps 
makes social change difficult in Pakistan. However, this rift is not the only 
reason for the culture’s lack of sympathy towards women. Chauvinism, conser-
vatism, and misogynism are collective societal traits that have been increasing in 
the Arab world over the past decade with the rise of Islamism. Even in Tunisia, 
known as the leading country for women’s rights in the Arab world, there has 
been an increase in societal pushback against women in recent years, much like 
the one experienced in Pakistan.  
In the public sphere, Tunisian Shari’a allows women the right to vote, the 
right to hold political office, and the right to work the same jobs as men. In the 
private sphere, Tunisian Shari’a allows women the right to divorce, the right to 
abortion, and the right to inheritance. Additionally, Tunisian laws are relatively 
favorable to women in cases of rape. The majority of these laws stem from the 
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1957 Code of Personal Status, a Tunisian piece of pro-women legislation passed 
after the nation gained its independence. This code gave women rights that they 
had not previously enjoyed in both the public and private spheres. These laws 
were extremely progressive and gave Tunisian women a sort of independence 
from men equal to those that were being experienced by American women in 
the 1950’s. These rights have been codified for over sixty years, making Tunisia 
theoretically one of the leading countries in terms of pro-women legislation and 
women rights (Mashhour 584). 
As can be seen in the treatment of women in Tunisia today, however,, the 
fact that these laws are codified does not necessarily mean they are being upheld 
by the ruling government. The contemporary problem that Tunisian women face 
is very similar to that in Pakistan. Not only is the government failing to enforce 
pro-women legislation, it is, in fact, hiding behind the very notion of feminism 
itself by publicly advocating for women’s interests while actually ignoring many 
women’s rights (Pinto). Media coverage of this issue has sparked an internation-
al feminist dialogue regarding the hypocrisy of the Tunisian government. News-
paper headlines read: “State feminism in Tunisia: reading between the lines,” 
“Women’s rights in Tunisia: promising future or religio-political game?” and “Is 
Tunisia the beacon of women’s rights it claims to be?”  These headlines reveal 
the startling extent to which the Tunisian government is failing to uphold its 
apparently pro-women legislature. 
In recent years, the Ennahda Party, led by Rachid Ghannouchi, has 
gained a footing as an Islamist movement in Tunisia. Ghannouchi’s call in 2011 
for a “moderate brand of Islam” was attractive to the nation’s lower class, rural 
population, due to the comfort and familiarity provided by religion, as seen earli-
er in the Pakistani context (Malkonian). However, in order to win over the upper 
elite class, Ghannouchi emphasized women’s rights in his platform, claiming to 
hold dear all the progress that feminists had worked for. He succeeded in win-
ning the vote and assumed office in 2011 just after the Tunisian Revolution that 
sparked the Arab Spring (Melkonian). Since then, Tunisia has seen a decline in 
women’s security across the country. Cases of abuse against women (physical, 
emotional, and sexual) have increased since 2011 to such a point that nearly fifty 
percent of the nation’s female population has experienced abuse at least once 
in their life (Pinto). There have been numerous attempts by women’s groups to 
speak out against this increasing abuse and neglect of women’s freedoms, but 
these attempts have only created further conflict between women’s group in the 
country. 
 As is the case in Pakistan, ideological conflicts between Islamic and sec-
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ular feminists have prevented unified resistance against the Tunisian government 
(“Women’s rights protest fizzles in Tunisia”). Further, class and social status 
play a large role in Tunisia’s politics, with class-division reinforcing the frag-
mentation of Tunisian feminism. As with Pakistan, Tunisia’s lower, rural class 
are generally more conservative and religious in their beliefs, while Tunisia’s 
elite are generally more liberal and secular. Instead of seeking common ground 
and working together to gain the attention of the government, these two groups 
publically undermine each other, fearful of the beliefs of the other. This process 
of delegitimization most commonly manifests itself as a resistance to the other 
faction’s protests. When secular, liberal feminists hold a rally against the gov-
ernment, Islamic feminists and conservative Islamic women often show up on 
site and protest against the protest (“Women’s rights protest fizzles in Tunisia”).
The same happens during Islamic feminist rallies. This attempt by both parties 
to delegitimize the other has been largely successful. As the rift between Islamic 
and secular feminist groups grows, hostilities increase and there is less oppor-
tunity for dialogue both between the two groups and between women and the 
Tunisian government in general. 
 In the case of both Tunisia and Pakistan, if feminist groups were able to 
collaborate despite their differences and unify as one voice, then it would not 
take long to exert real pressure for change within their governments. Meherzia 
Labidi, one of Tunisia’s few female politicians, is a strong advocate for women 
in the country. She recognizes the detrimental impact of the feminist gap on Tu-
nisian women and, therefore, calls for unity between parties in order to achieve 
social change. She challenges Tunisian feminists to put aside their differences, 
declaring that, “we have to meet in a mutual aim which is improving women’s 
rights… My daughters are not veiled. Shall we divide the house? Of course not! 
There is a place for me and for them; this is how I see women in Tunisian so-
ciety” (Labidi qtd. in El Amraoui and Kalboussi).  Labidi’s exhortation attests 
to the fact that at least some political figures are trying to affect change, but 
she cannot do it alone. She and her fellow government officials cannot work to 
improve the condition for women while feminist groups perpetuate infighting 
amongst themselves. In order for women in Tunisia and Pakistan to achieve the 
change they seek, they must present a unified front; they must open the door to 
dialogue by respecting each other’s similarities as well as differences. This ex-
change will lead to a stronger affinity between women and foster socio-political 
change.
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The secular and Islamic feminist movements in Pakistan, like in Tunisia, 
have been partially successful in bringing about legislative change that favours 
women’s rights. The lack of unity between the two major feminist groups, 
however, has hindered true social change. Dialogue between these two groups 
has been hostile and competitive, since each group attempts to delegitimize the 
other in order to promote its own agendas. In practice, this infighting serves only 
to delegitimize the feminist movement itself. Therefore, in order for dialogue 
between Pakistani feminists to be effective, both secular and Islamic women’s 
groups must acknowledge and work towards what unites them, rather than what 
divides them. It is time for Pakistani feminists to look beyond their “sectarian” 
differences and work together to secure rights for all women in Pakistan – re-
gardless of religion or social status. Only then will Pakistan see meaningful, 
lasting change in the lives of its women.
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